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ABSTRACT 
Health promotion ethics is moral deliberation about health promotion and its prac­
tice. Although academics and practitioners have been writing about ethics, and 
especially values, in health promotion for decades, health promotion ethics is now 
regaining attention within the broader literature on public health ethics. Health 
promotion is difficult to define, and this has implications for health promotion 
ethics. Health promotion can be approached in two complementary ways: as a 
normative ideal, and as a practice. We consider the normative ideal of health 
promotion to be thataspectofpublichealthpracticethatisparticularlyconcerned
withtheequityofsocialarrangements:itimaginesthatsocialarrangementscanbe
alteredtomakethingsbetterforeveryone,whatevertheirhealthrisks,andseeksto
achievethisincollaborationwithcitizens. This raises two main ethical questions. 
First: what is a good society? And then: what should health promotion contribute to 
a good society? The practice of health promotion varies widely. Discussion of its 
ethical implications has addressed four main issues: the potential for health 
promotion to limit or increase the freedom of individuals; health promotion as a 
source of collective benefit; the possibility that health promotion strategies might 
“blame the victim” or stigmatise those who are disabled, sick or at higher risk of 
disease; and the importance of distributing the benefits of health promotion fairly. 
Different people will make different moral evaluations on each of these issues in a 
way that is informed by, and informs, their vision of a good society and their 
understanding of the ends of health promotion. We conclude that future work in 
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health promotion ethics will require thoughtfully connecting social and political 
philosophy with an applied, empirically informed ethics of practice. 
Key Words: Ethics, health education, health promotion, moral philosophy, political 
philosophy, public health
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HOW TO THINK ABOUT HEALTH PROMOTION ETHICS 
Ethics is the discipline devoted to moral reasoning about what we should 
do. It is traditionally divided into: meta-ethics, concerned with fundamental 
questions like “what is good?” and “what are convincing ethical arguments?”; 
normativeethics, focused on rules, frameworks or principles for evaluation; 
and practical ethics, concerned with the ethics of practices such as 
regulating, policing, teaching or medical care.1 Health promotion ethics is a 
form of practical ethics.
A substantial literature in bioethics—the practical ethics of medicine 
and biotechnology—has existed since the 1960s.2 The public health ethics 
literature grew rapidly from 2000,3­13 initially focused on crises such as 
pandemics and bioterrorism.14 A small formal and informal literature on 
health promotion ethics15­22 and values23­27 has existed for some time,i but 
has recently regained attention within public health ethics. Our purpose is 
to survey key issues in health promotion ethics, and suggest approaches 
needed for this field to flourish.
Defining health promotion is notoriously difficult.26,29­32 In some juris­
dictions health promotion is an occupational category, so health promotion 
could be “what those practitioners do.” But many others promote health, 
within and beyond public health and medical systems, and health promotion 
ethics should arguably also be relevant to them. Complicating matters 
further, conditions that do promote health may not be implemented to 
promote health.33 Public transportation, urban design and the structure of 
markets can promote or undermine health without that intention; a country’s 
political culture and system can influence the determinants of health 
independent of a formal “health promotion” sector.34,35 This makes a 
discussion of health promotion ethics slippery: should we focus only on 
activities defined as health promotion, or should we include all activities 
i Practitioners’ extensive debate about values in health promotion has often occurred in online 
forums, so may not be captured in the literature.28
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that promote health?33 Finally, the boundaries between health promotion 
and the rest of public health are unclear, so health promotion ethics and 
public health ethics may not be meaningfully different. There is no absolute 
solution to these problems: we can only suggest a working conception of 
health promotion. To do this, we will distinguish between health promotion 
as a normative ideal, and health promotion as it is practiced. These can, but 
do not always, overlap.
The normative ideal of health promotion arises from a 30­year­old 
discourse, found in the Alma­Ata Declaration, the World Health Organization 
(WHO) “Global Strategy for Health for All by the Year 2000,” and the 
Ottawa Charter for Health Promotion.23,36,37 Bauman and colleagues suggest 
that Alma­Ata and “Health for All” created health promotion out of health 
education,ii promoting a then­radical account of health as more a product of 
social conditions than of clinical services, and emphasising equity, 
empowerment and justice.26,29,38,39 The Ottawa Charter powerfully asserted 
this account, listing “fundamental conditions and resources for health” as 
“peace, shelter, education, food, income, a stable eco­system, sustainable 
resources, social justice, and equity.”23 We think this ideal form of health 
promotion has two main distinguishing characteristics. The first is its vision 
of citizens: as active participants in and potential authors of their own 
health, people with whom health promotion practitioners should work 
directly and, to some extent, be guided by when forming goals and strategies. 
The second is its focus on increasing the equitable availability of the 
conditions and resources that improve health, including through structural 
change and advocacy.iii,34 Although this will at times overlap with risk 
reduction strategies, it emphasises primary prevention: promoting health 
for everyone, whether they are at low or high risk of developing disease.43 
On this idealised account, health promotion becomes thataspectofpublic
health practice that is particularly concerned with the equity of social
arrangements:itimaginesthatsocialarrangementscanbealteredtomake
thingsbetterforeveryone,whatevertheirhealthrisks,andseekstoachieve
thisincollaborationwithcitizens.
As it is impossible to cleanly separate health promotion from other 
aspects of public health, much of what follows will be relevant to public 
health in general. Our idealised account of health promotion is intended to 
reflect its character, rather than provide a watertight definition; analysing or 
ii The role of a health educator was clearer, of a health promoter looser. So it may have been 
easier to develop a procedural ethic for health education than for health promotion.20
iii This initial commitment may now be diluted by neoliberal individualism and behaviourism.26,40­42
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defending it in detail is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead we will 
focus on two underlying ethical questions: 
1. What is a good society? 
2. What should health promotion contribute to a good society?
These questions are relevant to practitioners, but also to anyone interested 
in health as a moral concern, or in health promotion as a political or social 
enterprise.
The practice of health promotion varies globally and is not always 
consistent with the idealised account.26,43,44 Because practice cannot be 
predicted from the ideal, health promotion ethics needs to engage the diversity 
of health promotion practices. Thus, in the latter part of the paper, we ask a 
third question: What ethical issues arise in activities intended to promote 
health? Answers to this question are relevant to anyone who attempts to 
improve the health of communities, including health promotion practitioners.
WHAT IS A GOOD SOCIETY?
Here we present an abridged account of some versions of the good society 
that appear in the public health and health promotion ethics literature. Most 
of these draw on political or moral philosophy. They are relevant because 
the intention to promote health or related good things can only be evaluated 
against our conception of a good society.
In one version of the good society, the population as a whole is made as 
healthy as possible using available resources. This utilitarian view prioritises 
maximising population health without much concern about who benefits or 
misses out. An alternative good society, strongest in American scholarship, 
emphasises the liberty of citizens as the most important good. This vision 
arises from libertarianism and some forms of liberalism, and only condones 
interventions designed to stop individuals from harming each other.45 
Another tradition, “justice as fairness,” builds on the work of John Rawls to 
focus on fair distribution of good things (whether health, quality of life, 
wellbeing, money or opportunities), with a particular concern for the least 
well­off.46 Yet another good society, drawing on classical Greek scholarship, 
emphasises the ability of citizens to participate actively in local civic life 
and live in accordance with their values.47 A tradition in Western European 
scholarship emphasises solidarity—willingness to stand together, share 
burdens and help one another—as an important characteristic of a good 
society.48,49 Although we have disaggregated these visions to clarify their 
differences, in practice they often overlap or cluster. The normative ideal of 
health promotion corresponds to certain visions of the good society, 
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particularly to the idea that a good society is a just society. The Ottawa 
Charter, for instance, strongly asserts the importance of equity.23 The ideal 
also resonates with traditions that emphasise civic virtue and solidarity. 
However, because ideals and practices are not always aligned, none of these 
values can be taken for granted in practice.42,43
WHAT SHOULD HEALTH PROMOTION CONTRIBUTE TO A 
GOOD SOCIETY?
What should the goals of health promotion be? Or: what should health 
promotion contribute to a good society? The answer might seem obvious: 
health promotion should promote health, so what health promotion should 
contribute to a good society is improved health.
This is not straightforward, however, because there is little agreement 
about how health should be defined.38 We discuss definitions of health in 
this section not to derive the perfect definition, but because a useful working 
definition is needed, for two reasons.29 First: so health can be distinguished 
from other good things, to allow precision about goals. When are we 
seeking to improve health? When to provide different good things? How is 
health related to these other good things? Second: so that activities that 
either promote health or are intended to promote health can be identified, 
because these, at least in one sense, constitute health promotion.
In the late 1970s, definitions of health were divided into two main 
camps: “negative” and “positive”.29,30,50 Christopher Boorse sought to 
develop a value­free, or “biostatistical” definition,51 based on functions 
such as reproduction or survival. Those with “functional abilities below 
typical efficiency” were diseased;51 health was theabsenceof such disease 
(thus a “negative” definition).iv On this definition, health promotion would 
entail, e.g., finding individuals with below­typical reproductive function, 
and improving their function to typical levels. In stark contrast, the 1978 
Declaration of Alma­Ata applied the WHO’s 1946 “positive” definition of 
health as “a state of complete physical, mental and social wellbeing, and 
not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.”36,53,v On this definition, 
iv This account is much criticised (e.g., as relying on relative judgements and ignoring things 
we commonly understand as health).29,52 
v This account is also much criticised: e.g., Bok argues “it has been variously called masterful 
or dysfunctional, profound or meaningless; defended as indispensable in its present formulation, 
seen as needing revision, or rejected as inviting the medicalization of most of human existence 
and abuses of state power in the name of health promotion.”54
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health promotion is charged with enabling every citizen to attain complete 
wellbeing.26 This stirring aspiration is an impossible task, and set health 
promotion up for an inevitable gap between rhetoric and practice.55,vi
More recent “mid­range” or “welfare” definitions of health sit between 
the negative biostatistical and positive wellbeing accounts.29,30 In the late 
1980s, Lennart Nordenfelt defined health as the ability to “fulfil vital 
goals.”56 Vital goals were those that, when fulfilled, allowed a person to 
experience a minimum acceptable degree of welfare in the long term.vii,viii 
David Seedhouse, later but similarly, defined health as the conditions that 
allowed people to work towards, or to fulfil, their “realistic chosen and 
biological potentials.”58 His main point was that health promotion must 
accept an open­ended conception of health:59 health will be different for 
each person, because each person’s chosen potential is different, reflecting 
their values. These definitions, admirably, allow space for individuals to 
live the life they choose. But they are practically problematic. They would 
require that health promotion either employ strategies compatible with 
vi David Buchanan wrote extensively about wellbeing as an end in health promotion.47 In 
philosophy, an “end” is good in itself; a “means” is good because it will get you something 
else that is good. Buchanan critiqued the WHO definition for conflating health and wellbeing, 
and for suggesting health was an end in itself. Health, he argued, is an instrumental good like 
money: simply a means to greater ends, not to be pursued for its own sake. Buchanan proposed 
we should strive not for health, but for eudaimonia, a complex concept from classical Greek 
scholarship, which involves the ability to evaluate one’s own desires. “The good life” 
Buchanan argues, “is the life spent seeking clearer understandings of values we think 
important to realise and striving to live our lives more closely attuned to those values.”47 What 
matters is to cultivate, in citizens, the mindfulness and wisdom required to continuously 
consider their own values and live in keeping with them. Buchanan makes this argument to 
resist what he sees as the rise of scientifically defined, individualistic, biomedical goals in 
health promotion, an over­emphasis on bodily health as an end in itself rather than a means. 
Buchanan’s theory is inspiring, with much to offer, but does not clarify why health promotion 
should be the institution charged with the monumental goal of creating wise citizens. 
vii This introduces normative questions, e.g.: What should count as a vital goal? What level of 
welfare is an acceptable minimum? Might we underestimate this minimum because we have 
lowered our expectations? Who gets to decide?
viii Venkatapuram recently combined Nordenfelt’s account with Nussbaum’s work to define 
vital goals. Nussbaum argued that a dignified human life required the ability to achieve all of 
the following, to a reasonable threshold: life, bodily health, bodily integrity (i.e., freedom 
from torture and other violence), to be able to use one’s senses, imagination, thought and 
emotions, to be able to reason about one’s life goals, to have opportunity for sympathetic 
bonds with other humans and concern towards other species, to be able to play, and to have 
control over one’s environment. Venkatapuram proposed that these can be thought of as vital 
goals: thus health is the ability to achieve a reasonable threshold of each of them. However, 
like the WHO definition, this account is extremely broad, so may not help distinguish the 
goals of health promotion from those of other practices, or health policy from public policy in 
general.52,57 
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everyone’s goals or potentials—likely to be impossible—or so tailored to 
individual goals that health promotion could only be delivered in a one­to­
one relationship, and could no longer engage in advocacy, structural or 
community­level change.
More recently other authors—Alan Cribb,29 and Madison Powers and 
Ruth Faden60—have produced definitions that better distinguish health 
from competing goods, and thus better identify health­promoting activities. 
We will characterise these definitions as useful,restrictedandcontextualised. 
Cribb summarises like this:
“It seems to me that if we stick fairly close to the biomedical con­
ception [of health] but combine aspects of wider conceptions with it 
we get close to a workable model of health which allows us to 
prevent some of the extremes of indeterminacy. I tend to use “health” 
to refer to “the absence of illness” where illness refers roughly to the 
object of healthcare practice rather than that of clinical science...”29
Cribb’s, and Powers and Faden’s, definitions have similar characteristics. 
They are useful, rather than absolute. They restrict health to the domains of 
the body and the objects of healthcare (loosely, what health means in 
ordinary language). And they connect this narrower definition to a context. 
Cribb argues that health must be understood as social and as only one of 
many “goods”. Health policy is part of public policy more broadly and is 
likely to deliver benefits other than health, and health must be weighed 
against other gains from policy decisions. Health is also social: it is socially 
determined, understood in a social and historical context, and negotiated in 
social relationships.29 Thus we can retain a narrow definition of health but 
recognise it is socially caused and connected. Powers and Faden, meanwhile, 
set their restricted definition of health into a broader definition of human 
wellbeing. Health, for them, is just one of six dimensions of wellbeing: the 
other five are:personalsecurity, reasoning,respect,attachmentandself-
determination. Everyone, they propose, has something like a fundamental 
right to achieve a sufficient threshold of each of these dimensions: a just 
society will provide this. The role of public institutions is to serve social 
justice, that is, to work towards sufficient wellbeing, in each of its six 
dimensions, for everyone.ix Individual public institutions might specialise in 
one dimension (e.g., health), but they must, overall, be committed to social 
justice, which means that they should not promote their “specialist” 
dimension while undermining other dimensions (e.g., they should not 
encourage disrespect for obese people to improve population health).60 This 
approach discourages blindly pursuing population health as an end in itself.47
ix Like Nordenfelt’s definition, this raises the question of how such a threshold can be identified. 
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These recent definitions of health suggest an overarching goal and a more 
specific objective for health promotion practice. The overarching goal would 
be to help ensure sufficient wellbeing in all its dimensions for everyone (that 
is, to work for social justice).60,x The specific objective of health promotion 
would be to improve health, understood via a useful and restricted definition 
set in a social context and in the context of the other dimensions of wellbeing. 
Given the overwhelming evidence that health is socially as well as biologically 
determined, the goal of health improvement will often need to be achieved 
via the mechanism of broader economic and social improve ment.61,62 How­
ever, a restricted definition prevents health promotion practitioners or others 
from doing whatever they please in the name of health, and requires at least 
a credible explanation of how an intervention might improve health.29,61,63 
These definitions also highlight the moral importance of considering the non­
health consequences of health promotion actions, as health policy is only one 
aspect of public policy, and health should not be pursued at the expense of 
other dimensions of wellbeing.33,60
WHAT ETHICAL ISSUES ARISE IN ACTIVITIES INTENDED TO 
PROMOTE HEALTH?
Thus far we have identified broad ethical currents underlying the normative 
ideal of health promotion. These currents—especially those around ideas 
of justice and community—are arguably the core values that health 
promotion practitioners use to explain and justify their practices.43 We have 
also begun to indicate some potential gaps between ideals and practices. In 
particular we have argued that, when it comes to practice, the concerns with 
justice and community embedded in early health promotion discourses 
should be disentangled from an open­ended conception of health, and 
instead connected to a useful,restrictedandcontextualised conception.
In this section we focus on ethical debates in health promotion practice. 
These debates reflect, and feed into, the two issues we have already 
considered: visions of the good society, and the proper goals of health 
promotion.xi Ethical discussions about the practice of health promotion can 
x Powers and Faden argue that public institutions are obliged to work towards justice. While 
health promotion may be more explicitly committed to justice in its rhetoric, in their view all 
aspects of public health, as a public institution, should serve justice. 
xi “Reflection” is thus a two way process: answers to health promotion practice dilemmas will 
reflect a vision of health promotion and the good society; conversely these visions should be 
engaged with everyday practice.
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be gathered loosely under four intersecting themes, echoing the value 
tensions rehearsed above. Considered together, they question whether and 
how ideals of justice and community can be operationalised in real­world 
contexts without unacceptable ethical costs. Although they intersect, we 
will discuss them separately: 
1. how health promotion might impinge on, or enhance, the freedom or 
autonomy of citizens; 
2. health promotion as a source of collective goods or benefits; 
3. victim blaming and stigmatisation; and
4. how the benefits of health promotion are distributed. 
Two more general observations about ethics in health promotion 
practice; first, doing health promotion ethics requires using and critiquing 
evidence.64,65 Outcomes or consequences (especially benefits and harms) 
are central to ethical evaluation. However, the evidence base in health 
promotion, particularly regarding the effects of complex interventions, is 
often limited,64,66 so decisions must be taken in the context of uncertainty. 
Second, ethical reasoning requires more than recourse to codes of ethics. 
Close attention to the strengths and weakness of ethical arguments and to 
the meaning of concepts is needed.64 There are several codes of ethics in 
this field (e.g.67­70). Their purpose is to codify—to provide a condensed list 
of rules for action—and their brevity makes them useful for busy pract­
itioners. However, they are most useful when seen as prompts to, and not 
substitutes for, moral deliberation. 
Health promotion and the freedom or autonomy of citizens
An early and central concern in health promotion ethics, particularly in 
American scholarship, has been incursion on freedoms or liberties that 
matter to individuals.18,71­74 Individual freedom is undoubtedly morally 
important; this is most clearly recognised in Western liberal democracies. 
In clinical ethics, respect for autonomy—generally operationalised as 
consent—marks out this area of concern.75 But in health promotion, consent 
is harder to rely on: it is difficult to know what should be consented to, who 
should consent, and what should be done when there is no community 
consensus.33 
Empowerment has often been suggested as a health promotion strategy 
to respect freedom. Here Braunack­Mayer’s analysis is useful.84 She 
argues—consistent with our discussion above—that the proper end of health 
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promotion is health improvement: empowerment is simply a means.xii 
Empowerment may not be achievable; empowerment strategies may assist 
some community members to dominate others, or encourage them to 
demand ineffective or harmful interventions, a concern echoed by prac­
titioners.70 So empowerment should not be pursued as an end in itself. 
Instead, expert or “top down” health promotion judgements, informed by 
theory and experience, should be informed by “bottom up” judgements of 
community groups, and vice versa, until a reflective equilibrium is reached. 
Empowerment thus becomes a means for reaching this equilibrium, not a 
go­to strategy for protecting freedom.84
So if empowerment cannot help us solve the problem of incursions on 
freedom, what might? The early literature in particular focused on 
identifying—and arguing against—actions likely to undermine freedom. 
These authors tend to work with a particular, limited, version of freedom, 
referred to as “negative freedom”: the freedom to be left alone, or not to be 
interfered with.xiii,78 They worry about persuasion (encouraging people to do 
or believe something through argument), coercion (imposing on the will of 
others using threats or force), or most notoriously, paternalism. Paternalism 
gathers several, usually three, meanings into a single word: interfering with 
a person’s autonomy or liberty, doing so without their consent, and doing so 
for their own good.xiv,76 It is possible to justify all of these, depending on our 
view of a good society, and on the particular case.45,77
Persuasion is the easiest action to justify. Alastair Campbell, for 
example, argues that persuasion can respect people’s autonomy if we are 
clear that we are persuading, do not distort the facts, argue overtly rather 
than influence covertly, and remain independent of vested interests.79 
Although respectful persuasion is clearly possible, many health social 
marketing campaigns instead engage in what Campbell calls “indoctrination,” 
usually in the name of “cut through” in a competitive media market.
xii This parallels sociological critiques of health promotion. “Positive” sounding discourses 
around empowerment or enablement are often, in practice, embedded in power hierarchies, 
systems of surveillance and restrictive conceptions of ends. So we have to examine both ideals 
and practices, asking what vision of a good society they assume and what they produce in the 
social world.
xiii Basic liberties, and non­interference in them, are very important (e.g., freedom from 
wrongful imprisonment or torture, and freedom of political expression.) Unfortunately 
arguments focused on negative freedoms tend to suggest that more trivial freedoms, such as 
the freedom to make unfettered consumer choices, are of equivalent moral importance to these 
much more significant freedoms.
xiv In political discourse paternalism is often equated with a “nanny state”.
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Coercion is a different matter. It is generally accepted that public health 
interventions should use the least coercive means available,80 and for good 
reason: past coercive policies (e.g., forcing people to have HIV tests early in 
the epidemic) frequently undermined trust in public health as an institution.4 
Health promotion is not immune: for example, employees might be forced to 
participate in a workplace health exercise program.16 So when might coercion 
or paternalism be justified?xv The most common allowances are in instances 
where interventions stop people from harming one another rather than from 
harming themselves (e.g., mandatory immunisation schemes to prevent 
hospital staff from infecting their patients and families or school children 
from infecting their peers), or when interventions interfere with actions that 
are ill­informed, or involuntary, or more controversially, not in keeping with 
a person’s most deeply­held goals.38,76,xvi Such conditions can be used to 
evaluate interventions, but they work best for those—like the workplace 
health program—where something is being done directly to individuals. 
They are less helpful for the structural, community or advocacy interventions 
that we have suggested might characterise health promotion. One could 
argue, for example, that high fat, high sugar foods should be regulated 
because individual consumers do not fully understand the risks, or do not 
mean to buy these foods, or that eating them is inconsistent with what they 
really want for their life. But these are difficult to demonstrate convincingly, 
and matter most to those, such as libertarians, who hold negative freedom—
the freedom to be left alone—to be the most important moral end.
There is an alternative that is more compatible with health promotion: the 
capability approach.57,85,86 The capability approach contends that people 
should be free to achieve wellbeing, and that this relies on them having real 
opportunities to live and to act in accordance with their values.85,xvii The 
capability approach encourages us to assess both the opportunities available 
to individuals, and those available to a whole community or nation. And it 
approaches freedom quite differently to the approaches described above. It 
does not assume that individuals should be completely independent, or that 
their most important interest is to be left alone. Rather, it emphasises that 
xv Dworkins’ typology of more or less justifiable paternalisms is generally considered the 
standard.81
xvi In Western liberal state policy, “Nudge” is currently influential, employing an allegedly 
unproblematic type of paternalism, “libertarian paternalism,” and based in behavioural 
economics and cognitive psychology.82 See detailed analysis and responses in the American 
Journal of Bioethics.83
xvii Writers in the capabilities approach would say “to be and to do” in accordance with their 
values. Martha Nussbaum’s list of “central capabilities” required for a dignified human life is 
provided in Note viii.
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people’s autonomy depends on their social, relational and political environ­
ment, and that they have a moral stake in that environment providing them 
with real opportunities, including the opportunity to be healthy. Thus, for 
example, rather than reducing our freedom, state taxation, subsidies and 
regulations that make it easier and cheaper to buy healthier food could 
provide real opportunities to be healthy, something that most people value.xviii
 Autonomy remains important, but a more sophisticated conceptualisation 
alters the discussion of freedom. Instead of asking “is this health promotion 
strategy instituting a paternalistic nanny state?” we are encouraged to ask “is 
this health promotion strategy providing individuals and communities with 
real opportunities that they are likely to value?”
Health promotion as a source of collective goods or benefits
Collective actions and collective goods have particular moral significance 
for health promotion, because its ideal form has emphasised community. 
This emphasis appears to be a present source of tension in health promotion. 
Health promotion is commonly criticised for becoming increasingly 
individualistic;26,40­42,88 simultaneously practitioners affirm their commitment 
to working with and for communities.43,70
We will deal with individualism in the next section, but first consider 
arguments regarding the moral significance of community. There is a long 
tradition of valuing community in political and moral philosophy; this is 
becoming increasingly prominent in public health and health promotion 
ethics.89,90 It reflects a vision of the good society in which shared values, the 
common good or solidarity are important and, as in the capability approach, 
people are thought of as potentially benefiting from, not just being 
threatened by, the fact that they live in a community.
This is, in part, about the existence and benefit of collective goods. 
There is a type of collective good that is simply the sum of individual goods 
(e.g., a lower average HIV prevalence in the population is the sum of many 
individuals not having HIV). But there is another kind of collective good 
that is greater than the sum of its parts: goods that can only exist through 
collective action, and which exist at a collective level. Widdows and Cordell 
suggest that these goods can be identified as the ones that we think of as 
xviii Libertarians often suggest that the only way to preserve consumer freedom is to limit 
intervention to information provision (e.g., food package labelling). The capabilities approach 
suggests that having to carefully analyse the labels of every food product to determine whether 
it is unhealthy is in fact a burden. Regulation to reformulate food and/or restructure the market 
to allow people of all levels of ability and wealth the opportunity to purchase healthy food 
easily would provide a more meaningful freedom.87 
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“its” goods, that is, the goods of “the community” as a whole, as opposed 
to “their” goods, that is the goods of the individuals who live in the 
community.89 So, for example, if we say “West Haven is a walkable city” or 
“France has high quality, affordable childcare services” or “Denmark’s 
food supply contains almost no transfats,” we are talking about goods that 
accrue to the entire community, to the body politic. Most importantly, they 
are goods that individuals cannot achieve for themselves: they can only be 
achieved through collective action. They are also better seen as opportunities 
(in the capabilities sense) rather than interferences. And the ideal form of 
health promotion discussed above is particularly well­oriented towards 
such goods. Because these goods have special moral significance, this 
suggests that in evaluating health promotion activities we might ask: “Will 
this benefit everyone?” and “Are we focusing on outcomes that can only be 
achieved through collective action?”
Victim blaming and stigmatisation
Individualism, and collective goods, can be connected by considering the 
wrongs that health promotion might do to people and communities.xix In 
short, health promotion practice seems likely to do wrong when it is method­
ologically individualistic, that is, when it understands social phenomena as 
largely a product of individual agency, of the goals, beliefs and actions of 
individuals, rather than focusing on collective goods and actions.44,88,91 This 
entails an oversimplified model of disease and risks two main wrongs: 
victim blaming and stigmatisation.xx
The potential for health promotion to “blame the victim” has been a 
longstanding concern in health promotion ethics.92,93 This expresses an 
important worry: is it just to consider individuals personally responsible for 
their health? As with all moral issues, a view of individuals as personally 
responsible tends to travel with a particular view of the good society, one 
that imagines people as fully rational, informed and in control of their lives, 
and thus values the protection of their negative freedom as a crucially 
important moral good.
xix Unjustifiably interfering in someone’s freedom, already considered, is also a wrong.
xx Note that victim blaming and stigmatisation are important wrongs, but not the only wrong 
we should be concerned about: e.g., in an American setting, employers may buy­in health 
promotion programs and then cut health insurance cover on the grounds that employees 
should be healthier.16 Each strategy needs to be considered case by case. Also: victim blaming 
and stigmatisation are widespread social trends. We are suggesting not that health promotion 
practitioners are especially guilty of them, but that they are especially obligated to avoid them 
because they are inconsistent with the goals and values of health promotion. 
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There are two key points to make here. The first is to distinguish causal 
from moral responsibility. We might, for example, prepare a meal for our 
family and in so doing unwittingly give them food poisoning; in this case 
we would be causally, but not morally, responsible.29 The second point to 
make is that there is no clear line between private and public actions in 
health: the strong evidence on social determinants shows that responsibility 
for health is diffuse.29,62 We all engage in practices that contribute to our 
health, but at best are only partially responsible for our health status. 
Further, empirical evidence shows that people tend to allocate responsibility 
to individuals to make sense of health problems, so we may be less likely 
to recognise this when it occurs.xxi,16,94
Many health promotion strategies may risk allocating responsibility 
unjustly. Workplace­based health promotion, for example, may give 
employees tools to endure a health­undermining workplace rather than 
attempting to change the institution.16 Social marketing campaigns 
frequently address viewers as individuals, exhorting them to change their 
behaviour and suggesting that this is easy despite the overwhelming 
evidence to the contrary.64,95,96 Given that these campaigns are widely 
thought to act on social norms, they arguably reproduce the tendency for 
members of the general public to unjustly allocate responsibility for health 
risks or diseases to individuals.
The second potential wrong is that negative messages about disabilities, 
illnesses or risks will increase the stigma experienced by people who are 
already living with those disabilities, illnesses or risks.64,97 Identification 
and labelling of differences between people can be benign, but become 
stigmatising when certain identified groups are stereotyped and perceived 
as other—as “not like us” or deviant—leading to loss of status and 
systematic discrimination against people living with conditions such as 
mental illness or obesity.44,98
Health experts sometimes suggest that stigma is a useful tool for 
population­level communications. This is consistent with simplistic health­
maximising utilitarianism: an impoverished view of the good society as 
one that should deliver the maximum possible amount of health on average. 
On this view, stigmatisation that “works” to improve health is morally 
acceptable. This argument is clearly ethically problematic. It focuses on the 
health dimension of wellbeing at the expense of other dimensions, such as 
respect.60 It ignores evidence that stigma makes life more miserable and 
xxi Note also that the empowerment discourse may imply that individuals should be able to take 
charge of their health.92
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stressful and so is likely to have direct health effects.98 It fails to recognise 
that being stigmatised travels with disadvantage, that stigmas tend to 
cluster, and that stigmatised conditions are only partly the responsibility of 
the individuals who experience them, such that these individuals should not 
be held responsible unless the other involved parties are also held 
responsible.29,44,98 All of these problems make such stigmatisation, whether 
deliberate or unintentional, unjust.
Health promotion practitioners do not always have control over the work 
they do. They may be deeply personally committed to building respectful 
relationships with communities over time, building community capabilities, 
and ensuring sustainability, but be required to implement standardised and 
potentially problematic interventions.43 Managerialism can encourage 
“ethics avoidance”, with scientific and managerial rationality overwhelming 
ethical concerns.29,99 David Buchanan, who developed one of few total 
theories of health promotion ethics in 2000 (Note vi), reacts explicitly 
against such rationality. He advocates responding to local situations rather 
than applying standardised solutions, acknowledging the importance of 
being trusted by communities and building solidarity, thinking of people not 
as faceless aggregations of statistics, or as “targets” for punishment and 
reward, but as citizens who are worthy of, and stand to benefit from, 
respectful engagement.47 This suggests the importance of accountability to 
communities,80 and suggests two different sets of responsibilities in health 
promotion. First, planners and policymakers should aim to create programs 
and strategies that minimise the risk of harming or wronging citizens, 
whether through stigmatising them, making them falsely personally 
responsible, or in other ways. Second, individuals on the “front­line” of 
health improvement, whether in official health promotion roles or otherwise, 
should deal respectfully with those whom they encounter and, where 
practicable, critically analyse, challenge and resist policies that fall short.
How to distribute the benefits of health promotion 
Our final ethical question is: how should the benefits and burdens of health 
promotion be distributed? Asking this entails a vision of the good society  as 
one that fairly distributes resources, opportunities or wellbeing. Powers and 
Faden’s theory is useful here. They argue that those in society who are least 
well off experience “densely woven systematic patterns of disadvantage,”60 
that is, they experience many forms of disadvantage simultaneously. They 
are likely to have less money, poorer housing, less work and lower status 
work, poorer quality of education and so on, all at once. These interact and 
compound, worsening disadvantage. So those least well­off would require 
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extraordinary good luck or heroic effort to attain even an average level of 
wellbeing, usually through no fault of their own.60 For Powers and Faden, 
this makes densely patterned disadvantage particularly unjust. Because they 
see public institutions as especially responsible for increasing social justice, 
they argue that public health and health promotion, as public institutions, 
are particularly obliged to intervene in severe disadvantage. 
By now it should be clear that we are broadly convinced by and 
committed to the normative ideal of health promotion summarised earlier: 
focused on the fairness of social arrangements, and on achieving the 
conditions that underpin good health for everyone, in collaboration with 
communities. For us this entails a reflexive commitment to a vision of the 
good society that emphasises social justice and collective goods, informed 
not only by moral and political arguments about the nature of the good 
society, but also by strong evidence on the social determinants of health,62 
and knowledge of health promotion practice. Others will occupy different 
positions: for example, a utilitarian who wants to maximise average health 
without too much concern for its distribution or the potential ill­effects, or 
a libertarian who is most concerned about negative freedom, or someone 
focused on eudaimonia at the level of the individual (Note vi).
We emphasise a particular way of thinking about the distribution of 
benefits and burdens. People are not all equally autonomous. Those who 
have fewer opportunities relative to their fellow citizens are not autonomous 
in the same way as those who have more opportunities. Someone with an 
excellent education, high social standing, a good job, a supportive social 
network, and a warm, dry home in a friendly, safe neighbourhood is 
autonomous in a more meaningful way than someone with none of these 
things. Conceptualising freedom as opportunity, and understanding health 
promotion as an institution obliged to increase the availability of those 
opportunities, encourages us to redress this unfairness. Conversely, those 
who would emphasise freedom as the right to be left alone would see this 
as an intrusion rather than a justice. We are concerned that health promotion 
strategies should avoid increasing the existing stigma and unjust allocation 
of personal responsibility that multiply disadvantaged people already 
experience.98 This is based in our earlier arguments that health should not 
be pursued at the expense of other aspects of human wellbeing. But a 
utilitarian author may be less concerned about these issues, and a libertarian 
may welcome a conception of individuals as personally responsible. Like 
solidarity theorists, we prefer collective actions that produce collective 
goods, both for their ability to redress disadvantage and their aspirational 
qualities. Some collective interventions—such as using national regulation 
to reformulate food—will benefit everyone. We think that if fairness is 
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important, collective interventions that occur in settings or communities—
such as improving urban design, transportation or the availability of fresh 
food markets—should be distributed at least equally, if not preferentially, 
to disadvantaged communities. However, those who think we have no 
special responsibility to the less well­off may not agree.
Goldberg argues that while we should aim to improve everyone’s health, 
we should aim to improve poor people’s health more, because they are 
currently bearing most of the burden.44 A simplistic utilitarian position 
would oppose this contention. Increase average health, the argument goes, 
and the least well­off will also benefit: remember Rose’s famous prevention 
paradox.xxii,100 We make two points here. Rose’s colleagues have lately 
emphasised his egalitarian commitments: that he argued for structural 
interventions as beneficial for everyone, including the least well­off.100 And 
in practice, “population­level” interventions often focus on altering 
behavioural and biological risk factors, rather than facilitating structural 
and political change. Identifying and intervening in people with risk factors 
(e.g., overweight) tends to benefit the affluent, because they have the agency 
required to engage and participate.101,102
We have, anecdotally, heard decision­makers justify such interventions 
as “helping the people who want to be helped” and so “focusing where we 
can be most effective.” But this is only morally acceptable via a particular 
vision of a good society: one in which health is a product of individual 
choices and fairness can be de­prioritised. In a recent International Union 
for Health Promotion and Education ethics forum, practitioners worried that 
they were rarely funded to engage in structural change or address identified 
needs in poor communities, but instead were expected to offer interventions 
that only already­advantaged people could benefit from.70 For practitioners, 
at least, the commitment to justice built into the normative ideal of health 
promotion appears to remain a central concern. But despite the ideal, health 
promotion practice is often dominated by individualistic interventions.44,88 
Current movements in health promotion towards complexity and systems 
thinking may help counter this trend;103 however visionary actions from 
health promotion opinion leaders, changes within bureaucratic systems, and 
modelling from the non­government sector may be required to achieve 
long­term change. 
xxii Rose observed that populations contain many people at low to moderate risk of developing 
a disease, and few at high risk of developing that disease. The prevention paradox is that 
greater population health improvement may be obtained via widespread small improvements 
in those many at low risk, rather than via dramatic change in those few at high risk. 
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CONCLUSION 
Future scholars of health promotion ethics should self­consciously work 
between social and political philosophy on the one hand and applied, 
empirically informed, ethics of practice on the other. It is important to be 
able to map, and debate, competing normative visions of health promotion, 
including but not limited to the normative ideal we have elaborated here. 
We should ask how such normative ideals can be defended, but also how 
norms change in different times and places. We need to attend to principles 
(such as minimising harm) but also to the contexts that shape policies, 
norms and practices. 
Many unanswered questions with ethical implications remain for future 
work. What is health promotion now? Does it still exist? If so, does it bear 
any relation to the 1980s normative ideal? How might it be different from 
or similar to other aspects of public health practice, and does this matter? 
What should it be in future? How can we better understand collective goods 
or benefits, and how should we weigh potentially competing goods, such as 
maximising average benefit vs. fairer distribution of benefit? When can 
citizens be reasonably expected to stand in solidarity with others to improve 
everyone’s health? How can we convince decision makers to attend to the 
potential harms of interventions as well as the benefits? 
Although statements of principle and codes of practice have symbolic 
importance, doing practical ethics requires engagement with underlying 
arguments and concepts, and also with the details of everyday practice. 
Simple prescriptions cannot suffice because every situation is different. 
Examining ethical questions requires a conversation: a process of reasoning 
back and forth between differing views of the good society and different 
exercises of practical wisdom and experience. It requires openness among 
all parties to be transformed in the exchange. We hope that the questions we 
have posed in this review, and the range of answers we have presented, will 
spark an enlivened conversation about both health promotion and health 
promotion ethics, and so be of use to policy makers, practitioners and 
everyone concerned with the health of communities. 
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